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1. Composition as Identity:  
Framing the Debate 
A .  J .  C O T N O I R  
 
“Because, if a thing has parts, the whole thing must be the same as all the parts.” 
(Theatetus 204a) 
 
“Thus, totality is nothing else but plurality contemplated as unity.”  
(Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Categories of Understanding III.7) 
 
“A composite is nothing else than a collection or aggregatum of simple substances.” 
(Leibniz, The Monadology (In The Rationalists 1960, p.455) 
1. Groundwork: Motivations 
Composition is the relation between a whole and its parts — the parts are said to 
compose the whole; the whole comprises the parts. But is a whole anything over and 
above its parts taken collectively? 
 
It is natural to think “no”. Consider the following scenario. 
Suppose a man owned some land which he divides into six parcels. […] He 
sells off the six parcels while retaining ownership of the whole. That way he 
gets some cash while hanging on to his land. Suppose the six buyers of the 
parcels argue that they jointly own the whole and the original owner now 
owns nothing. Their argument seems right. But it suggests that the whole was 
not a seventh thing. (Baxter (1988a), 85) 
The land-buyers’ argument seems correct because the parts jointly make up the whole; 
the parts taken together and the whole are, in some sense, the same. 
 
Some philosophers have expressed sympathy with the view of the land-buyers. Frege, 
in the Foundations of Arithmetic, claimed, 
If, in looking at the same external phenomenon, I can say with equal truth 
‘This is a copse’ and ‘These are five trees’, or ‘Here are four companies’ and 
‘Here are five hundred men’, then what changes here is neither the individual 
nor the whole, the aggregate, but rather my terminology. (Frege (1980), §46) 
The five trees are parts of the copse. A whole batallion may have four companies as its 
parts; each company may have five platoons as parts; each platoon may consist of 
twenty-five soldiers. But the five hundred soldiers just are the batallion. Take away the 
soldiers and you have taken away the platoons, the companies, and the batallion. A 
copse is nothing but a group of trees. A batallion is nothing over and above a group of 
soldiers. 
 
This idea has a long and complicated history. It was already a view under 
consideration among the ancients, making an appearance in Plato’s Parmenides and 
Sophist.1 The view’s provenance and influence through the middle ages up to the Early 
Modern period is traced in Normore and Brown’s (2013) contribution to this volume. 
 
The intuitive notion that the whole is ‘nothing over and above’ its parts — that the 
whole is the same as its parts — may be clarified by claiming the whole is identical, in 
some sense or other, to its parts. This is the thesis of composition as identity (CAI). 
 
But why should this sameness be considered identity? One intuitive line of thought 
comes from Armstrong (1978): consider two objects that have a part in common, say 
Hollywood Boulevard and Vine Street, where their common part is the famed 
intersection. It is natural to say that the Hollywood is partially identical to Vine. But 
of course, we may consider further cases with larger areas of ‘overlap’, such as Seventh 
Avenue and Broadway. Since Seventh runs diagonally across Manhattan, its common 
part with Broadway is larger than usual, creating Times square. Relatedly, large 
portions of the famous Route 66 were replaced by the I-40; the ‘partial identity’ of the 
two roads covers significant ground. And, of course, the limiting case of such overlap 
is just the case where two roads are wholly identical to each other. But the continuity 
between the cases indicates that the limit case is not different in kind. Similarly, each 
                                                      
1See Harte (2002, ch. 2) for details. 
part of a whole is partially identical to the whole. But then shouldn’t we say that the 
parts taken together are identical to the whole as well? 
 
Besides its intuitive appeal, there are other motivating concerns that lead one 
naturally to CAI. The first is that CAI can easily explain the particularly intimate 
relationship between parts and wholes. Sider (2007) notes various natural principles 
to which philosophers have been attracted that represent aspects of this intimacy. For 
example, take the following two: 
Inheritance of Location 
A whole is located where its parts are located. 
Uniqueness of Composition 
Any wholes having the same parts are identical. 
For CAI theorists, the truth of these principles is no mystery. A whole shares its 
location with its parts because the whole is identical to its parts. If two wholes have the 
same parts, then because each whole is identical to those parts, the wholes are 
identical merely by the transitivity of identity. Perhaps other theories of composition 
can explain these and similar principles; indeed, Cameron’s (2013) contribution to 
this volume attempts to do just that. But CAI does so plainly, taking the intimacy at 
face value. 
 
A second motivation is that CAI satisfies an intuitively plausible no double-counting 
constraint on possible inventories of the world. Consider again an example from 
Baxter (1988a): 
Someone with a six-pack of orange juice may reflect on how many items he 
has when entering a ‘six items or less’ line in a grocery store. He may think he 
has one item, or six, but he would be astonished if the cashier said ‘Go to the 
next line please, you have seven items’. We ordinarily do not think of a six-
pack as seven items, six parts plus one whole. (579) 
Astonishment at the cashier is justified, we think, because she has counted the same 
thing twice. She has clearly violated the no double-counting policy. Of course, in this 
case (as in the case of the land-buyers above) there are a number of practical reasons 
why one should not count a six-pack as an additional thing over and above the six 
cans — presumably, one pays for such things all at once. But the general prohibition 
about double-counting is not merely a practical constraint; it is thought to be an 
ontological constraint. And quite a few philosophers have endorsed it. Lewis claimed, 
If you draw up an inventory of Reality according to your scheme of things, it 
would be double counting to list the [parts] and then also list [the whole]. 
(Lewis (1991), 81) 
Likewise, Varzi (2000) argues that, while it is often useful to countenance wholes in 
addition to their parts, this should not be thought of as counting wholes in addition to 
their parts when drawing up our inventory of the world. This is particularly obvious, 
he claims, when the double-counting involves wholes and their undetached parts. So, 
Varzi adopts the following policy: 
Minimalist View: 
An inventory of the world is to include an entity 𝑥 if and only if 𝑥 does not overlap 
any other entity 𝑦 that is itself included in that inventory. 
Varzi then goes on to present various arguments and considerations in its favor.2 
Similar count policies are also endorsed by Cotnoir (2013) and Schaffer (2010).3 
 
One advantage of CAI is that it makes satisfying such a policy easy. One way objects 
can overlap is if one is part of the other. But if wholes are identical to their parts, then 
wholes are never counted as distinct from their parts. And so overlapping objects of 
this sort are never counted as distinct. But there is another way objects can overlap, 
namely, by sharing a proper part. Suppose that the one has managed to include two 
distinct overlapping wholes 𝑥 and 𝑦 in one’s inventory of the world, such that neither 
is a part of the other, but they have some proper part 𝑧 in common. But if wholes are 
identical to their parts, one’s inventory of the world has included the parts of 𝑥 as 
distinct from the parts of 𝑦. But the parts of 𝑥 are not totally distinct from the parts of 𝑦, since both include 𝑧 among them. And this violates the no double-counting rule. 
 
                                                      
2See also Berto and Carrara (2009) for objections. 
3In Cotnoir (2013), I suggested that a count should partition the universe. Schaffer’s constraint, by 
contrast, applies only to fundamental, or basic, entities: 
Tiling Constraint 
The basic actual concrete objects collectively cover the cosmos without overlapping. 
Schaffer then provides a number of arguments for why the fundamental entities in any ontology must 
satisfy it. 
Even though such a counting policy is natural, one might wonder whether it has any 
deep philosophical motivations. Though there are many possible reasons,4 I will only 
mention two that provide additional motivation for CAI. First is the avoidance of 
colocation. It is a commonplace metaphysical view that two distinct material objects 
cannot occupy the same region of space time. Wallace (2011a) argues that this 
thought extends to pluralities of material objects as well: two distinct pluralities of 
objects cannot occupy the same region of space time, and further one material object 
cannot occupy the same region as many distinct material objects. According to 
Wallace, colocation of the latter kind seems just as bad as the more usual kind. But 
CAI avoids the problem. Because they are identical, parts and wholes are colocated, 
but only in the trivial sense that everything is colocated with itself. Secondly and 
relatedly, CAI can handle cases of causal overdetermination. Merricks (2003) argues 
against the existence of wholes, since wholes would be in competition for the causal 
powers of their parts. But if CAI is true, wholes and their parts are not competitors. 
Parts collectively cause whatever wholes individually cause, because wholes and their 
parts are identical.5 
 
Another possible philosophical motivation for CAI derives from considerations 
involving supervenience. Consider Armstrong (1997): 
The mereological whole supervenes upon its parts. But equally, the parts 
supervene upon the whole. […] This has the consequence that mereological 
wholes are identical with all their parts taken together. Symmetrical 
supervenience yields identity. (12) 
Armstrong here suggests that there is an important metaphysical interdependence 
between parts and wholes, and this is best explained as identity. Of course, the two-
way supervenience between parts and wholes is controversial, but something the CAI 
theorist should accept. 
 
Perhaps the major motivation for CAI is that it implies the ‘ontological innocence’ of 
classical mereology. Classical mereology (to be discussed in detail in §4) is the 
                                                      
4For a good start, see Varzi’s (2000) and Schaffer’s (2010) arguments. 
5For (much) more detail on this line of argument, see Wallace (2009), ch. 5. 
currently dominant formal theory of parts and wholes. It has been put to many 
applications, and served as a foundation for a great number of metaphysical theories. 
But classical mereology is ontologically extravagant; it has as an axiom that whenever 
there are some things there is a whole composed of them. This ‘universalist’ feature of 
classical mereology has been a source of much controversy. Proponents of restricted 
theories of composition often object that there is no such thing as an object composed 
of, say, the Eiffel Tower and some electron in the President’s nose. But if CAI is true, it 
would go some way toward alleviating these worries. Witness Lewis (1991): 
But given a prior commitment to cats, say, a commitment to cat-fusions is not 
a further commitment. […] Commit yourself to their existence all together or 
one at a time, it’s the same commitment either way. […] In general, if you are 
already committed to some things, you incur no further commitment when 
you affirm the existence of their fusion. The new commitment is redundant, 
given the old one. (81–82) 
And again Armstrong (1997): 
Mereological wholes are not ontologically additional to all their parts, nor are 
the parts ontologically additional to the whole that they compose. (12) 
Insofar as one accepts the existence of the Eiffel Tower and that electron in the 
President’s nose, since the whole made up of them is identical to them, one accepts the 
existence of the object composed of them. Since everything is identical to itself, 
universalism should come as no surprise. And so, presumably the CAI theorist can 
reap all the theoretical benefits of classical mereology without any additional 
ontological cost. Hawley’s (2013) contribution to this volume examines this possible 
motivation in detail. Varzi’s (2013) contribution also addresses this motivation by 
attempting to reconcile this thought about ontological innoncence with a more 
standard Quinean approach to ontological commitment.  
 
So much for motivations. In §2, I turn to the varieties of CAI that have been 
developed, and mention some options that have yet to be developed. These varieties 
are not without problems; in §3, I present some of the main objections to CAI in the 
contemporary debate. In §§4–5, I present some technical background that is often 
presupposed in the debate. Axioms and models for classical mereology are given in §4, 
highlighting relevant theorems along the way. In §5, I present an example plural logic, 
and discuss some relevant issues involving plural identity and multigrade predicates. 
All this, I hope, will provide some groundwork and structural support for the 
excellent and intriguing essays in this volume. 
 
2. Blueprints: Varieties of CAI 
On the face of it, CAI seems to be a simple, straightforward thesis that reduces a 
difficult question about the nature of composition, to a much easier question about 
the nature of identity. Most contemporary metaphysicians would agree with Lewis 
(2001) when he writes, 
Identity is utterly simple and unproblematic. Everything is identical to itself; 
nothing is ever identical to anything else except itself. There is never any 
problem about what makes something identical to itself; nothing can ever fail 
to be. And there is never any problem about what makes two things identical; 
two things never can be identical. (192–193) 
But this is quite a modern and philosophically loaded view. One can distinguish at 
least two different notions of identity: numerical identity and qualitative identity. 
Things are numerically identical when they are counted the same. Things are 
qualitatively identical whenever they have all their properties in common. 
But philosophers have taken a stand and generated an orthodoxy: there is no such 
distinction. The ‘indiscernibility of identicals’ and ‘identity of indiscernables’ jointly 
yield that things are numerically identical if and only if they are qualitatively identical.  ∀𝑥∀𝑦(𝑥 = 𝑦 ↔ (𝜑(𝑥) ↔ 𝜑(𝑦))) 
Call this biconditional ‘Leibniz’s Law’. Here 𝜑 is usually intended as schematic, 
ranging over any extensional predicate. That is, the principle must be restricted so as 
not to imply the indiscernibility of identicals with respect to intensional properties of 
objects. Leibniz’s Law is often taken to be definitive of identity; if a relation does not 
satisfy it, by definition it is not an identity relation. Obviously related is the standard 
elimination rule for identity, the ‘substitutivity of identicals’. 𝑥 = 𝑦                            𝜑 𝑥𝜑(𝑦)  
But then this rule, combined with the fact that identity is reflexive (e.g. everything is 
identical with itself), can be used to show that identity is unique; it is not possible for 
there to be two extensionally distinct relations satisfying Leibniz’s Law.6 So, on the 
orthodox view, there appears to be only one way of developing the claim that 
composition is identity. 
 
This is a bit too quick, however, as CAI is a thesis about many things (some parts) 
being identical to one thing (a whole). As we will see concretely in §5, what is really 
needed is an identity predicate that takes not only singular terms, but also plural 
terms. One would also need to generalize Leibniz’s Law accordingly. Notice that a 
whole is a single thing, while the parts are many things. It appears, then, that the whole 
and its parts are discernible, at least with respect to their number. So one must take 
some care in formulating the view. Moreover, the orthodox view also says nothing 
about the modal force of identity; for example, it might be argued that composition is 
contingent identity, to reflect the idea that wholes may survive changes to their parts. 
 
As a result of these complications, there are a variety of ways to develop CAI. 
Weak CAI: 
The relationship between the parts taken collectively and the whole is analogous to 
identity. 
Moderate CAI: 
The relationship between the parts taken collectively and the whole is non-numerical 
identity. 
Strong CAI: 
The relationship between the parts taken collectively and the whole is numerical 
identity. 
Lewis (1991) concluded that the difficulties involving generalizing the identity 
relation, and the initial troubles with Leibniz’s Law showed that only weak CAI could 
be maintained. What is needed, then, is a theory of composition that preserves many 
of the relevant aspects of identity. Sider (2007), in a similar vein, attempts to construct 
a theory of composition that does just this. 
                                                      
6The proof, which presupposes classical logic, can be found in Williamson (2006) who cites Quine. But 
see Schecter for a theory of multiple identity relations satisfying the substitutivity of identicals based in 
a weakly classical logic. 
 Since moderate CAI takes composition to be non-numerical identity, there could 
feasibly be as many varieties of moderate CAI as there are variant theories of identity. 
The inspiration can be put by taking Lewis’s words literally, “Ordinary Identity is the 
special, limiting case of identity in the broadened sense” (Lewis (1991), 85). For 
example, Baxter (1988a; 1988b; 1999) sees the number of things as relative to what he 
calls ‘counts’. A six-pack that is one thing in one count may be six things in another. 
More fundamental than the numerical identities within counts is the cross-count 
identity of what is counted variously. Composition, on this view, is a case of cross-
count identity. Similarly, Cotnoir (2013) defends moderate CAI by taking 
composition to be a generalization of numerical identity; but one that is still an 
equivalence relation satisfying an appropriately generalized version of Leibniz Law. 
 
A more radical option is to fly in the face of orthodoxy by claiming that composition 
is purely qualitative identity, where qualitative identity does not imply numerical 
identity. Another option, inspired by considerations raised by Butler, and arguably 
developed in Baxter (1988a), would distinguish between identity in the ‘strict and 
philosophical’ sense (i.e. numerical identity) and identity in the ‘loose and popular 
sense’, and suggest that composition is the latter. Of course, there is an orthodox weak 
CAI variant of this view; it will include the thesis that loose identity is not a kind of 
identity at all, but merely one of its analogues. Or, one might have a version of 
moderate CAI holding that composition is relative identity (à la Geach (1962)). This 
would reflect the idea that composed objects fall under different sortal predicates than 
their parts. 
 
The view that has received the most attention is strong CAI. Although many have 
attributed strong CAI to Baxter (1988a; 1988b; 1999), this is incorrect since Baxter 
rejects the orthodox view of numerical identity, except within counts. In fact, as Yi 
(1999) rightly notes, Baxter argues against strong CAI insofar as he thinks that the 
whole and its parts are never to be included within the same count, and thus would 
never be numerically identical. Although Sider (2007) does not endorse strong CAI, 
his work certainly developed it in many ways. Bohn (2009) and Wallace (2011a; 
2011b) appear to be the only adherents of strong CAI. 
 
Finally, I hinted above at another important classification that cuts across the weak 
CAI, moderate CAI, and strong CAI taxonomy. This is the distinction between count-
based views and non-count-based views. Recall that CAI was originally motivated by 
the idea that there are different ways of counting the same external phenomena: the 
six-pack vs. the six cans, the batallion vs. the five hundred soldiers. Some versions of 
CAI — the count-based ones — attempt to preserve this basic idea, and thus feature 
‘ways of counting’ prominently. Other versions leave counts by the wayside and 
develop the view independently. It is notable that many of the defenders of CAI in the 
literature have endorsed count-based theories.7 However, many of the arguments 
against CAI have been leveled against non-count-based variants. 
 
As is clear, there are a number of rival versions of the thesis; no doubt there are others 
yet to be invented. Each variant will undoubtedly have strengths and weaknesses over 
others. It is to those weaknesses that I now turn. 
 
3. Problems: Structural or Superficial? 
CAI is not without criticism. Not only the various actual theories, but its very 
motivations have recently come under attack. This section will provide a brief 
summary of some of the most prominent objections, without pausing to supply any 
lines of response. I will start with objections to the motivations, proceed to objections 
based on linguistic considerations, and close with objections based on metaphysical 
considerations. 
 
First, Sider (2007) argues that strong CAI does not explain the inheritance of location 
thesis. The inheritance of location thesis can be read two ways: (i) a whole is (wholly) 
located wherever its parts (taken collectively) are located; and (ii) a whole is (partly) 
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they are in Cotnoir (2013). Wallace (2011a; 2011b) has counts feature in her notion of ‘relative 
counting’ in order to avoid certain objections. 
located wherever its parts (taken individually) are located. Sider thinks that (ii) is the 
relevant fact to be explained, however, as this concerns a more fundamental relation 
between a thing and each of its parts. Strong CAI can explain only (i). And so strong 
CAI can only give an incomplete account of the intimacy of composition. 
 
Second, some have suggested that it is unclear whether accepting CAI justifies a 
commitment to mereological universalism. Merricks (2005) gives a modal argument 
that CAI entails universalism; that is, he claims that if composition is restricted, then 
CAI is false. The argument, which is too complicated to go into here, turns on the 
following premises: (i) if CAI is true, it is so necessarily; (ii) if two things are identical, 
they are so necessarily; and (iii) it is possible that some plurality of objects compose 
some singular object. Sider (2007) provides a variant of Merricks’ modal argument. In 
addition, Sider gives the following line of argument. For any things, the 𝑥s, there are 
some 𝑦s identical to the 𝑥s (namely, the 𝑥s themselves). But the intuitive idea behind 
strong CAI is that speaking of the many 𝑦s is equivalent to speaking of them as a 
single 𝑦. Substituting yields that for any 𝑥s, there is some 𝑦 identical to the 𝑥s, and 
hence some 𝑦 composed of the 𝑥s, by strong CAI. 
 
But these arguments have recently come under fire. Cameron responds by pointing 
out that strong CAI only establishes that some parts compose a whole iff the parts are 
identical to a whole. But this does entail that, given some things, they in fact compose 
a whole; he thus rejects Sider’s ‘dodgy move’ of replacing the 𝑦s with a single 𝑦 in the 
above argument. He also provides a more detailed response to the Merricks argument. 
Rather than responding directly to Sider and Merricks, McDaniel (2009) provides a 
direct argument against the entailment. He shows that a mereological nihilist — one 
who accepts that composition never occurs — who accepts that extensionally 
equivalent properties are identical would be forced to accept strong CAI. But since 
nihilists reject universalism, strong CAI does not entail it. In his contribution to this 
volume, Bohn (2013) takes on these arguments and defends unrestricted strong CAI. 
 
Third, some have argued that CAI does not imply the ontological innocence of 
mereology. The primary arguments are due to Yi (1999). His argument has two parts: 
(i) the only version of CAI that implies the innocence of mereology is strong CAI; and 
(ii) strong CAI is false. In favor of (i), Yi provides some level of detail in arguing that 
Lewis’ version of weak CAI does not yield ontological innocence; but I take it he 
intends these criticisms to apply more generally to variants of moderate CAI as well. 
In favor of (ii), let Genie be the fusion of Tom and Jerry. Then strong CAI yields that 
Genie is identical to Tom and Jerry. Since Genie is one of Genie,8 we can substitute: 
Genie is one of Tom and Jerry. But this last claim is clearly false. Koslicki (2008) runs 
the following argument against the innocence of Lewis’s weak CAI. She considers a 
world with only two objects: 𝑎 and 𝑏. Universalism implies the existence of an object 𝑐, the fusion of 𝑎 and 𝑏. She claims that because 𝑐 ≠ 𝑎 and 𝑐 ≠ 𝑏, 𝑐 is a new (possibly 
objectionable) ontological commitment. 
 
While the strength of these arguments against the motivations for CAI vary, it is clear 
that the initial attractions of CAI are not without controversy. 
 
Another class of objections to CAI aim at its commitments to various aspects of 
philosophy of language. van Inwagen (1994) is an early example of this type of 
objection. He claims that CAI theorists cannot state their view grammatically in 
natural language. 
There is the ‘is’ of (singular) identity. This word makes syntactical sense when 
it is flanked by singular terms and variables […] There is the ‘are’ of (plural) 
identity. This word makes sense when it is flanked by plural terms and plural 
variables […] But what kind of syntactical sense is there in taking either the ‘is’ 
or ‘are’ and putting a singular term or variable on one side of it and a plural 
term or variable on the other? (210–11) 
Sider (2007) flags this concern as well: “Grammatical revisionism was perhaps already 
in place right at the start” (57). Whether or not one takes this syntactic point 
seriously,9 the correctness of van Inwagen’s and Sider’s claims depends heavily on the 
results the best theories of agreement in the syntax of English. The grammaticality of 
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the right. Yi recognizes this, and suggests a fix. 
9van Inwagen seems to, Sider seems not to. See also Cameron (2012), fn 4. 
such sentences is empirical question; and Cotnoir (2013) argues that on at least one 
linguistic theory of plural agreement, such claims are grammatical. 
 
A similar sort of linguistic objection to CAI (particularly, strong CAI), is Sider’s 
(2007) contention that it destroys the usefulness of plural quantification. I will defer 
discussion of these objections until after plurals are properly presented (§5). 
 
More metaphysically minded objections can be found as well. The most obvious is the 
objection from Leibniz’s Law. Consider Lewis (1991): 
[E]ven though the many and the one are the same portion of reality, and the 
character of that portion is given once and for all whether we take it as many 
or take it as one, still we do not really have a generalized principle of the 
indiscernibility of identicals. It does matter how you slice it – not to the 
character of what’s described, of course, but to get the form of the description. 
What’s true of the many is not exactly what is true of the one. (87) 
Lewis appears to be right. For example, consider a square divided diagonally into two 
right triangles. The triangles compose the square, and so according to moderate CAI 
and strong CAI the triangles are identical to the square. But of course the triangles 
have the property of being triangular and lack the property of being square, whereas 
the square has the property of being square and lacks the property of being triangular. 
But, according to the orthodox view, if we do not have the indiscernibility of 
identicals, we do not really have identity. Compare Sider (2007): 
Defenders of strong composition as identity must accept Leibniz’s Law; to 
deny it would arouse suspicion that their use of ‘is identical to’ does not really 
express identity. (57) 
The objection seems most acute for strong CAI. It is perhaps less acute for more 
radical versions of moderate CAI, but only at the cost of having to reject (or at least 
generalize) the orthodox view of identity. Indeed, as is made clear in his chapter of 
this volume, Baxter (2013) does not generally accept the indiscenibility of identicals, 
and things there are principled reasons for rejecting it in the case of parts and wholes. 
Turner’s (2013) contribution to this volume formalizes these commitments in 
illuminating ways. 
 Merricks (1992) suggests a further metaphysical objection to CAI: some versions 
appear committed to the implausible view that wholes have their parts essentially. The 
argument, in effect, turns on the idea that if parts are identical to a whole, and identity 
is necessary, then the whole is identical to those parts in every possible world. Of 
course the objection is a problem only insofar as mereological essentialism is; but one 
might wish to avoid the commitment if one can.10 One option is a form of CAI 
according to which composition is contingent identity. Another avenue of response 
involving modal parts is pursued by Wallace (2013) in her contribution to the volume. 
 
Another recent metaphysical objection to CAI is McDaniel’s (2008) argument that 
strong CAI is incompatible with strongly emergent properties. McDaniel argues that 
any acceptable version of CAI ought to accept a plural duplication principle. 
PDP 
if the 𝒙s compose 𝒘, then 𝒛 is a duplicate of 𝒘 iff there are some 𝒚s that are plural 
duplicates of the 𝒙s and compose 𝒛. 
 
But this principle is incompatible with strongly emergent properties, that is, natural 
properties of a whole that do not locally supervene on the natural properties of its 
(atomic) parts. Whether there are any such things as strongly emergent properties is 
controversial. But on the face of it, they do seem to go directly against the CAI 
theorist’s contention that a whole is ‘nothing over and above’ its parts. But Sider 
(2013), in his contribution to this volume, shows how a strong CAI theorist might 
avoid this argument. 
 
Again, there may be lots of ways to respond to these objections. Of course, different 
versions of CAI might be vulnerable to some objections and not others. I cannot 
canvass all the combinations and variations here. Some of the various options are 
explored in the essays that follow. 
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4. Foundations: Mereology 
We have been using ‘part’, ‘whole’, and ‘composition’ without providing any precise 
interpretation of these terms. There are a number of formal theories of parts, wholes, 
and the composition relation that holds between them; but classical mereology has 
been the most influential. It is probably the dominant view among contemporary 
metaphysicians; indeed, many of the essays in this volume presuppose it. What 
follows is a brief introduction to classical mereology.11 I start by presenting a standard 
axiom system, and proceed to discuss several important theoretical implications of 
classical extensional mereology that relate to CAI. In the background to mereology, let 
MA0 to be any axiom system sufficient for classical first-order logic with identity. In 
this axiom system, the parthood relation (symbolized by ≤) is the only primitive and 
must satisfy the axioms MA1–MA3 below. 
MA1 
Reflexivity: ∀𝑥(𝑥 ≤ 𝑥) 
MA2 
Antisymmetry: ∀𝑥∀𝑦((𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑥) → 𝑥 = 𝑦) 
MA3 
Transitivity: ∀𝑥∀𝑦∀𝑧((𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑧) → 𝑥 ≤ 𝑧) 
MA1 says that everything is part of itself; in other words, identity is a limit case of 
parthood. MA2 says that things that are parts of each other are identical. MA3 says 
that if something is part of another thing which is part of a third thing, the first is part 
of the third. MA1–MA3 ensure that the parthood relation is a partial order. 
 
We can now define several useful mereological notions: 
MD1 
Proper Parthood: 𝑥 < 𝑦:= 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑥 ≠ 𝑦 
MD2 
Overlap: 𝑥 ∘ 𝑦:= ∃𝑧(𝑧 ≤ 𝑥 ∧ 𝑧 ≤ 𝑦) 
MD3 
Disjoint: 𝑥 ≀ 𝑦:= ¬𝑥 ∘ 𝑦 
                                                      
11For a more complete introduction to mereology more generally, the reader should consult Varzi’s 
excellent entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. For more formal details, see Hovda (2009). 
According to MD1, something is a proper part of a whole whenever it is a part distinct 
from the whole. MD2 says that two things overlap whenever they have a common 
part. MD3 tells us that two things are disjoint when they have no parts in common. 
 
Given the notion of proper parthood, questions regarding the decomposition of 
objects may arise; for example: if an object has a proper part, shouldn’t it have 
another? To guarantee this, one can add a supplementation axiom to MA1-MA3. Here 
is the standard candidate:12 
MA4 
Strong Supplementation: ∀𝑥∀𝑦(𝑥 ≰ 𝑦 → ∃𝑧(𝑧 ≤ 𝑥 ∧ 𝑧 ≀ 𝑦)) 
One special case of 𝑥 ≰ 𝑦 is when 𝑦 < 𝑥; so MA4 tells us, in that case, that if 𝑦 is a 
proper part of 𝑥, then there is some part of 𝑥 disjoint from 𝑦 — call it 𝑧. It is 
appropriate to think of 𝑧 as the ‘remainder’ of 𝑥 when 𝑦 is removed. It may also be 
helpful to think of MA4 in its contraposed form: ∀𝑧(𝑧 ≤ 𝑥 → 𝑧 ∘ 𝑦) → 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦. Thus, 
the axiom guarantees that, if every part of 𝑥 overlaps 𝑦, then 𝑥 is part of 𝑦. 
 
But what is required for the composition of objects from others? Importantly, I haven’t 
yet specified when wholes exist. To do this, we need a definition of fusion.13 
MD4 
Fusion: 𝖥𝗎(𝑡,𝜑):= ∀𝑦(𝑦 ∘ 𝑡 ↔ ∃𝑥(𝜑 ∧ 𝑦 ∘ 𝑥)) 
So, 𝑡 is the fusion of the 𝜑s when 𝑡 overlaps exactly those things that overlap a 𝜑. As 
mentioned above, in classical mereology fusions are unrestricted; we need to 
guarantee the existence of a fusion for every instance of 𝜑 with only 𝑥 free. 
MA5 
Unrestricted Fusion: ∃𝑥𝜑 → ∃𝑧  𝖥𝗎(𝑧,𝜑) 
                                                      
12There are at least two other candidates, one weaker and one stronger: 
MP1: Weak Supplementation: ∀𝑥∀𝑦(𝑥 < 𝑦 → ∃𝑧(𝑧 ≤ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑧 ≀ 𝑥)) 
MP2: Complementation: ∀𝑥∀𝑦(𝑥 ≰ 𝑦 → ∃𝑧∀𝑤(𝑤 ≤ 𝑧 ↔ (𝑤 ≤ 𝑥   ∧ 𝑤 ≀ 𝑦)) 
In the presence of MA1-MA3, MP2 implies MA4 which implies MP1, but none of the converse 
implications hold. Classical mereologists have favored MA4 for reasons related to extensionality (see 
below). 
13I use the term ‘fusion’ simply as the converse of the term ‘compose’. Wherever 𝑥 is the fusion of the 𝜑s, the 𝜑s compose 𝑥. This is in contrast to how some other authors use the term (e.g. van Inwagen 
(1990) and Varzi (2008) where composition is a relation that holds between non-overlapping objects 
and a whole). 
Since we can substitute any suitably open sentence for 𝜑, MA5 is an axiom schema; it 
has infinitely many instances since we have infinitely many suitably open sentences.14 
This fusion axiom guarantees that for every (specifiable) subset of the domain objects, 
there is an object that overlaps anything that overlaps the members of that subset; that 
is, we always have a fusion of the members of that subset. 
 
That’s it. MA0–MA5 is the standard axiomatization of classical mereology. To recap, 
we simply have classical logic (MA0), the partial order axioms for parthood (MA1–
MA3), a supplementation axiom (MA4), and a fusion axiom schema (MA5). 
 
It is worth pausing to notice that classical mereology itself yields some important — 
albeit controversial — connections between parthood, composition, and identity. In 
particular, there are several ‘extensionality principles’ that follow immediately from 
MA0-MA5.15 
EO 
Extensionality of Overlap: ∀𝑧(𝑧 ∘ 𝑢 ↔ 𝑧 ∘ 𝑣) → 𝑢 = 𝑣 
EP 
Extensionality of Parthood: ∃𝑧(𝑧 < 𝑢 ∨ 𝑧 < 𝑣) → (∀𝑤(𝑤 < 𝑢 ↔ 𝑤 < 𝑣) → 𝑢 = 𝑣) 
UC 
Uniqueness of Composition: (𝖥𝗎(𝑢,𝜑) ∧ 𝖥𝗎(𝑣,𝜑)) → 𝑢 = 𝑣 
All three extensionality principles are theorems of classical mereology.In words, EO 
states that if two things overlap all the same things, they are the same thing.16 EP 
states that if two composite objects have the same proper parts, then they are 
                                                      
14Because MA5 is an axiom schema, like all first-order theories, it will have unintended models. As an 
illustration, assume there are 𝜅-many atoms in our domain. Then a complete Boolean algebra will have 
size 2! (subtracting the empty set: 2! − 1). If 𝜅 is finite then the domain is finite, and if 𝜅 is infinite 
then the domain is uncountable. In either case, we will not have a countably infinite domain. But by the 
Löwenheim-Skolem theorems, we know that if any first-order theory has an infinite model, it will have 
a countably infinite model. In effect, the axiom schema MA5 fails to quantify over all subsets of the 
domain, but merely the first-order definable ones expressed by open sentences 𝜑(𝑥). Formulating MA5 
using plural logic avoids these issues. 
15These principles are so-named due to the parallel extensionality principle of set theory: two sets are 
identical if and only if they have all the same members. 
16Proof: Notice that ∀𝑧(𝑧 ∘ 𝑢 → 𝑧 ∘ 𝑣) → 𝑢 ≤ 𝑣 is logically equivalent to Strong Supplementation 
(MA4). But then applying antisymmetry (MA2) to two converse instances of that implication suffice to 
prove EO. 
identical.17 The principle is restricted only to composite objects — objects that have 
proper parts — to allow for more than one uncomposed object, or atom.18 UC claims 
that if two things are fusions of the 𝜑s, then they are the same thing.19 
 
Some philosophers have rejected classical mereology on the grounds of extensionality 
principles.20 But others have regarded extensionality principles as virtues. For 
example, Goodman (1951) endorses hyperextensionality for any type of ‘collection’ 
(e.g. sets, classes, fusions, etc): objects built from the same atoms are identical. 
A class is different neither from the single individual that exactly contains its 
members, nor from any other class whose members exactly exhaust this same 
whole. […] the nominalist recognizes no distinction of entities without a 
distinction of content. (Goodman (1951), 26) 
Of course, mereology is independent of these nominalist motivations. But CAI 
theorists are apparently committed hyperextensionality for fusions, and indeed 
extensionality principles EP, EO, and UC. After all, if the whole is identical to its parts, 
then any two wholes composed of the very same parts must be identical to each other, 
by the transitivity of identity. In that case, then objections to extensionality principles 
would thereby be objections to CAI. McDaniel (2013) in his contribution to this 
volume explores various options for CAI theorists who reject UC.  
 
5. Foundations: Plurals 
Plural constructions are ubiquitous in natural language: “My children are loud.” 
contains the plural description ‘my children’; “Abe and Ian are playing with each 
other.” contains the plural term ‘Abe and Ian’ and the plural pronoun ‘each other’. Of 
                                                      
17Proof: from definitions MD1 and MD2, among non-atomic objects, if 𝑥 and 𝑦 have the same proper 
parts, then anything that overlaps 𝑥 overlaps 𝑦 and vice versa. Formally:  
 ∃𝑧(𝑧 < 𝑢 ∨ 𝑧 < 𝑣) → (∀𝑤(𝑤 < 𝑢 ↔ 𝑤 < 𝑣) → (𝑤 ∘ 𝑢 ↔ 𝑤 ∘ 𝑣)) 
 But then, by EO and the transitivity of the logical implication, we have EP. 
18Suppose any two objects with the same proper parts were identical. Since atoms have no proper parts, 
any two atoms trivially have all the same proper parts. Thus every atom would be identical to every 
other atom. 
19Proof: Assume that both 𝑢 and 𝑣 are fusions of the 𝜑s. From MD5, we have ∀𝑦(𝑦 ∘ 𝑢 ↔ ∃𝑥(𝜑 ∧ 𝑦 ∘𝑥)) and ∀𝑦(𝑦 ∘ 𝑣 ↔ ∃𝑥(𝜑 ∧ 𝑦 ∘ 𝑥)). But, again by transitivity of implication, this implies that ∀𝑦(𝑦 ∘ 𝑢 ↔ 𝑦 ∘ 𝑣). Now, 𝑢 = 𝑣 follows via EO. 
20The literature is rife with objections to extensionality principles. For a start, see the discussion and 
references in Varzi (2008). 
course, these sentences are plural in form only; one could easily recast them so they 
contain only singular constructions: “My first child is loud, and my second child is 
loud.” or “Abe is playing with Ian and Ian is playing with Abe.” 
 
But some sentences involving plurals cannot be recast in this way. Consider the 
sentence “The crowd is loud.” which contains a plural description ‘the crowd’. 
Attempting to recast would yield, “Crowd member 1 is loud and crowd member 2 is 
loud ….” But this is clearly not an adequate paraphrase; after all, a crowd of people 
may be loud, even if none of the members of the crowd is loud on her own. A more 
famous example is the Geach-Kaplan sentence: “Some critics admire only each other.” 
There is no way to translate this sentence using singular quantification.21 These 
irreducibly plural constructions can be accommodated in various plural logics. 
 
It would appear that merely stating the thesis of CAI necessarily involves a plural 
formulation. Recall Lewis: 
The fusion is nothing over and above the [parts] that compose it. It just is 
them. They just are it. (Lewis (1991), 81) 
But claims like ‘they are it’ and ‘it is them’ are irreducibly plural. It cannot be reduced 
to the claim that each individual part is identical to the whole, as that is not what is 
meant.22 And CAI does not involve the claim that the set of parts are identical to the 
whole. After all, the set of parts is an abstract object, whereas the whole need not be; as 
Boolos (1984) notes, “I am eating the Cheerios.” does not involve my eating a set. This 
irreducibly plural character of the characteristic identity statements of CAI leads one 
to believe that CAI is closely bound up with the nature of the logic of plurals. 
 
It will be useful, then, to give a formalization of an example plural logic. Suppose we 
start with first-order classical logic with identity. In order to obtain a plural logic, add 
to our first-order language the following. 
• Plural Variables: 𝑥𝑥, 𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧, … 
• Plural Constants: 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑐𝑐, … 
                                                      
21See Boolos (1984). 
22But see Baxter (2013). 
• Plural Quantifiers: ∀, ∃, … 
• Plural Predicates: 𝐹, 𝐺, 𝐻, … 
• Logical Predicate: ≺ 
The set of formulas is defined in the usual way, except that ordinary non-logical first-
order predicates (e.g. 𝐹, 𝐺, 𝐻, …) may only take singular terms and variables as 
arguments, while non-logical plural predicates (e.g. 𝐹, 𝐺, 𝐻, …) may only take plural 
constants and variables. Likewise, singular variables must be bound by ∀ or ∃; and 
plural variables must be bound by ∀ or ∃. The set of sentences is merely the standard 
restriction to those formulas where all occurring variables (if any) are bound. 
 
While I will not provide a full semantics for this language, the main idea is that while 
singular terms (i.e. singular constants and variables) denote single objects from the 
first-order domain, plural terms (i.e. plural constants and variables) denote 
‘pluralities’ of objects from the first-order domain. A plurality of objects is, intuitively, 
just some objects. Just as singular predicates are usually interpreted as sets of objects, 
plural predicates are interpreted as sets of pluralities.23 
 
The primitive predicate ≺ is meant to represent the ‘is one of’ relation: 𝑎 ≺ 𝑏𝑏 is true 
if the thing denoted by 𝑎 is one of the things denoted by 𝑏𝑏. So, ≺ relates singular 
terms variables to plural terms (e.g. ∃𝑥𝑥∀𝑦(𝑦 ≺ 𝑥𝑥) is well formed). Plural identity = 
is a generalization of standard first-order identity, and may be defined as follows: 𝑥𝑥   =   𝑦𝑦:= ∀𝑧(𝑧 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ↔ 𝑧 ≺ 𝑦𝑦). So = takes plural terms in both argument 
places. 
 
There are some key additional principles governing the standard logic of plurals that 
one may wish to be satisfied.24 
PA1 
Comprehension: ∃𝑦𝜑(𝑦) → ∃𝑥𝑥∀𝑦(𝑦 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ↔ 𝜑(𝑦)) 
                                                      
23Giving a full semantics would take us too far afield. The typical semantics, modeling pluralities via 
sets, is sometimes considered to have an objectionable ontology. But the ontological innocence of plural 
quantification has been highly controversial. See Boolos (1984), Resnik (1988), and Linnebo (2003) for 
a start. 
24See Rayo (2007) for motivations and arguments involving these principles. 
PA2 
Extensionality: ∀𝑥𝑥∀𝑦𝑦(∀𝑧(𝑧 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ↔ 𝑧 ≺ 𝑦𝑦) → (𝜑(𝑥𝑥) ↔ 𝜑(𝑦𝑦))) 
The plural comprehension principle PA1 states that every satisfiable predicate 𝜑 has a 
corresponding plurality of things that satisfy it. PA1 is restricted to satisfiable 
predicates since it is typically thought that there is no such thing as the ‘empty’ 
plurality. PA2 says that any two pluralities having exactly the same things among 
them have all and only the same plural predicates true of them. Another way of seeing 
PA2: pluralities that are ≺-indiscernible are indiscernible tout court. Taking seriously 
the identity of indiscernibles, PA2 implies plural identity of any such 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦. 
 
An important fact about the plural logic given above: plural predicates and singular 
predicates are distinct. I noted above that some plural predications are irreducibly 
plural, while others are not. That is, some plural predication is distributive: 𝐹(𝑎𝑎) 
implies 𝐹(𝑎) for each 𝑎 ≺ 𝑎𝑎. Some plural predication is collective: 𝐺(𝑏𝑏) is true 
while 𝐺(𝑏) may be false (for some 𝑏 ≺ 𝑏𝑏). 
 
On the above approach to plural logic, plural predicates like is loud are ambiguous: 
there are two distinct predicates, one of which is plural (𝐿) and the other singular 
(𝐿).This approach proliferates homonymous predicates. Moreover, since I have not 
drawn any semantic connections between 𝐿 and 𝐿, there is nothing that could validate 
(or invalidate) the inference from 𝐿(𝑎𝑎) to 𝐿(𝑎). In other words, there is no way to 
draw the collective/distributive distinction. 
 
One option is to forget about plural predicates like 𝐹, 𝐺, 𝐻, … and simply allow our 
first-order predicates 𝐹,𝐺,𝐻,… to take either plural or singular terms as arguments. 
On this approach both 𝐹(𝑎) and 𝐹(𝑎𝑎) are well-formed. The primitive predicate ≺, 
could likewise be extended to relate either singular or plural terms to plural terms. As 
such, it would represent both the ‘is one of’ relation and the ‘are among’ relations. 
Such predicates are called multigrade. Allowing multigrade predicates into plural logic 
opens up a variety of new issues, too many to explore here.25 
                                                      
25For an excellent exploration of the history and philosophy of multigrade predicates, see Oliver and 
Smiley (2004). For the first major contribution to the study of their logic, see Morton (1975). 
 Note that the identity claims characteristic of CAI are naturally thought to be 
multigrade. If the parts (plural) just are the whole (singular); we would need an 
identity relation = that could be flanked by a plural term on the left and a singular 
term on the right (𝑎𝑎   =   𝑏). Likewise, if the whole just is the parts, we require = to be 
flanked by plural terms on the right and singular terms on the left (𝑏   =   𝑎𝑎). As such, = must be multigrade in both argument places in order to express the relevant many-
one and one-many identities.26 Presumably, CAI theorists would want one-one 
identities expressed by 𝑎 = 𝑏 to coincide with the singular identity = of first-order 
logic. Likewise, many-many identities expressed by 𝑎𝑎 = 𝑏𝑏 ought to coincide with 
the plural identity = of standard plural logic. 
 
These considerations were partly responsible for Lewis’ retreat to weak CAI. 
I know of no way to generalize the definition of ordinary one-one identity in 
terms of plural quantification. We know that 𝑥 and 𝑦 are identical iff, 
whenever there are some things, 𝑥 is one of them iff 𝑦 is one of them. But if 𝑦 
is the fusion of the 𝑥𝑥, then there are some things such that each of the 𝑥𝑥 is 
one of them and 𝑦 is not; and there are some things such that 𝑦 is one of them 
but none of the 𝑥𝑥 is. (87) 
Indeed, whether and how CAI should be formulated in plural logic is an interesting 
and open question addressed by some of the essays collected here. 
Philosophers who write on mereology — indeed, even those who endorse CAI — 
often use plural quantification to give the fusion definition and axiom, rather than 
relying on an axiom schema. For instance: 
MD4’ 
Plural Fusion: 𝖥𝗎(𝑡, 𝑥𝑥):= ∀𝑦(𝑦 ∘ 𝑡 ↔ ∃𝑥(𝑥 ≺ 𝑥𝑥 ∧ 𝑦 ∘ 𝑥)) 
MA5’ 
Plural Unrestricted Fusion: ∀𝑥𝑥∃𝑧  𝖥𝗎(𝑧, 𝑥𝑥) 
Note that because there is no ‘empty’ plurality, the fusion axiom maybe be simplified 
from MA5, by eliminating its antecendent.27 
                                                      
26The concept of many-one and one-many identity is due to Baxter (1988b). 
27Moreover, mereology with MA5’ does not suffer the same problem with non-standard models that 
was noted with MA5. 
 It is worth highlighting, however, that combining mereology and plural quantification 
proves to be expressively very powerful. Lewis (1991; 1993) called this combination 
‘megethology’ and shows how it allows one to express hypotheses about the size of the 
universe, how it (combined with a theory of singleton functions) has the expressive 
resources of 𝑍𝐹𝐶, and (with Hazen and Burgess) how to simulate quantification over 
relations. 
 
But there is some reason to think that if some versions of CAI are true, megethology 
has nowhere near this sort of expressive power. Indeed, certain varieties of CAI have 
consequences for plural logic. Yi (1999) suggests that considerations from plural logic 
rule out CAI as a possible view, and his contribution to this volume Yi (2013) 
develops and adds to these arguments. Sider (2007) argues that strong CAI has 
numerous bad consequences for plural logic and otherwise wreaks havoc on the 
usefulness of plural logic. Primarily, it eliminates the possibility of distributive plural 
predicates, it requires a rejection of plural comprehension (PA1), and it forces a 
collapse in that ‘is one of’ to behave exactly like ‘is part of’. The formal and 
philosophical consequences of these results are explored in Sider’s (2013) contribution 
to the volume. Others have suggested that plural logic can come to the CAI theorist’s 
aid. Cotnoir (2013) argues that the moderate CAI theorist can co-opt considerations 
from plural logic to provide independently motivated responses to objections. 
Hovda’s (2013) contribution to the volume develops a number of plural languages 
that are friendly to the CAI theorist. The ontological/ideological commitments and 
expressive power of mereology, plurals, and any of the varieties of CAI is an area that 
is just beginning to be discovered in full detail.28 
 
References 
Armstrong, D. M. 1978. Universals and Scientific Reasoning. Vol. II. Cambridge 
University Press. 
                                                      
28Thanks to Don Baxter, Doug Edwards, Elisabetta Lalumera, Federico Luzzi, Aidan McGlynn, and 
Giacomo Melis. 
Armstrong, D. M. 1997. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Baxter, D. L. M. 1988a. “Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense.” Mind 97: 576–582. 
Baxter, D. L. M.  1988b. “Many–One Identity.” Philosophical Papers 17: 193–216. 
Baxter, D. L. M.  1999. “The Discernibility of Identicals.” Journal of Philosophical 
Research 24: 37–55. 
Baxter, D. L. M. 2013. “Identity, Discernibility, and Composition.” In Composition as 
Identity, ed. A. J. Cotnoir and D. L. M. Baxter. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Berto, F., and M. Carrara. 2009. “To Exist and to Count: a Note on the Minimalist 
View.” dialectica 63 (3): 343–356. 
Bohn, E. D. 2009. Composition as Identity. PhD thesis, University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst. http://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations/92 
Bohn, E. D.  2013. “Unrestricted Composition as Identity.” In Composition as Identity, 
ed. A. J. Cotnoir and D. L. M. Baxter. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Boolos, G. 1984. “To Be is to Be the Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of 
Some Variables).” Journal of Philosophy 81: 430–450. 
Borghini, A. 2005. “Counterpart Theory Vindicated: A Reply to Merricks.” dialectica 
59: 67–73. 
Cameron, R. P. 2012. “Composition as identity doesn’t settle the special composition 
question.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 84, No. 3, pp. 531-554. 
Cameron, R. P. 2013. “Parts Generate the Whole, but They are not Identical to It.” In 
Composition as Identity, ed. A. J. Cotnoir and D. L. M. Baxter. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Cotnoir, A. J. 2013. “Composition as General Identity.” In Oxford Studies in 
Metaphysics, ed. D. Zimmerman and K. Bennett. Oxford University Press. Vol. 8, pp. 
295-322. 
Frege, G. 1980. The foundations of arithmetic: a logico-mathematical enquiry into the 
concept of number. Ed. J. L. Austin. 2nd ed.. Northwestern University Press. 
Geach, P. T. 1962. Reference and Generality. Cornell University Press. 
Goodman, N. 1951. The Structure of Appearance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Harte, V. 2002. Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hawley, K. 2013. “Ontological Innocence.” In Composition as Identity, ed. A. J. 
Cotnoir and D. L. M. Baxter. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hovda, P. 2009. “What is Classical Mereology?” Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (1): 
55–82. 
Hovda, P. 2013. “Logical Considerations on Composition as Identity.” In Composition 
as Identity, ed. A. J. Cotnoir and D. L. M. Baxter. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Inwagen, P. van. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
Inwagen, P. van.. 1994. “Composition as Identity.” In Philosophical Perspectives, ed. J. 
E. Tomberlin, 8:207–220. Atascadero CA: Ridgeview. 
Koslicki, K. 2008. The Structure of Objects. Oxford University Press. 
Lewis, D. 1991. Parts of Classes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Lewis, D.  2001. On the plurality of worlds. Blackwell. 
Lewis, D.  1993. “Mathematics is Megethology.” Philosophia Mathematica 1: 3–23. 
Linnebo, Ø. 2003. “Plural Quantification Exposed.” Noûs 37: 71–92. 
McDaniel, K. 2010. “Composition as identity does not entail universalism.” 
Erkenntnis 73 (1):97-100. 
McDaniel, K. 2008. “Against Composition as Identity.” Analysis 68 (2): 128–133. 
Merricks, T. 1992. “Composition as Identity, Mereological Essentialism, and 
Counterpart Theory.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2) (June): 192–195. 
Merricks, T.  2003. Objects and Persons. Oxford University Press. 
Merricks, T. 2005. “Composition and Vagueness.” Mind 114: 615–637. 
Morton, A. 1975. “Complex Individuals and Multigrade Relations.” Noûs 9: 309–18. 
Normore, C. G., and D. J. Brown. 2013. “On Bits and Pieces in the History of 
Philosophy.” In Composition as Identity, ed. A. J. Cotnoir and D. L. M. Baxter. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Oliver, A., and T. Smiley. 2004. “Multigrade Predicates.” Mind 113: 609–681. 
Rayo, A. 2007. “Plurals.” Philosophy Compass 2: 411–427. 
Resnik, M. 1988. “Second-Order Logic Still Wild.” Journal of Philosophy 85: 75–87. 
Schaffer, J. 2010. “Monism: the Priority of the Whole.” Philosophical Review 119 (1): 
31–76. 
Schecter, J. “Weakly Classical Theories of Identity.” Review of Symbolic Logic. 
Sider, T. 2007. “Parthood.” The Philosophical Review 116: 51–91. 
Sider, T. 2013. “Consequences of Collapse.” In Composition as Identity, ed. A. J. 
Cotnoir and D. L. M. Baxter. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Turner, J. 2013. “Donald Baxter’s Composition as Identity.” In Composition as 
Identity, ed. A. J. Cotnoir and D. L. M. Baxter. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Varzi, A. 2013. “Counting and Countenancing.” In Composition as Identity, ed. A. J. 
Cotnoir and D. L. M. Baxter. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Varzi, A. 2000. “Mereological Commitments.” dialectica 54: 283–305. 
Varzi, A. 2008. “The Extensionality of Parthood and Composition.” The Philosophical 
Quarterly 58: 108–133. 
Varzi, A.  “Mereology.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2006/entries/mereology/. 
Wallace, M. 2013. “Composition as Identity, Mereological Essentialism, and Modal 
Parts.” In Composition as Identity, ed. A. J. Cotnoir and D. L. M. Baxter. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Wallace, M. 2009. “Composition as Identity.” PhD thesis, University of North 
Carolina, Chapel Hill. 
Wallace, M. 2011a. “Composition as Identity: Part I.” Philosophy Compass. Vol. 6, No. 
11, pp. 804–816. 
Wallace, M. 2011b. “Composition as Identity: Part II.” Philosophy Compass. Vol. 6, 
No. 11, pp. 817–827. 
Williamson, T. 2006. “Absolute Identity and Absolute Generality.” In Absolute 
Generality, ed. A. Rayo and G. Uzquiano, 369–390. Oxford University Press. 
Yi, B. 1999. “Is Mereology Ontologically Innocent?” Philosophical Studies 93: 141–160. 
Yi, B. 2013. “Is There a Plural Object?” In Composition as Identity, ed. A. J. Cotnoir 
and D. L. M. Baxter. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
